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Chapter 8
Thinking About Social Securitys
Trust Fund
Kent A. Smetters
The U.S. Social Security Act of 1935 placed a relatively strong emphasis on
individual equity: retirement benefits were designed to be closely linked to
taxes paid. An individual was insured if he worked at least five years in
covered occupations and earned at least $2,000 in those jobs before reach-
ing the age 65. The first benefits were to be paid to those who turned age 65
in 1942, five years after people began to pay the social security payroll tax.
The original program achieved some equity across individuals as well: bene-
fits were calculated according to a progressive formula that gave a higher
rate of return on payroll taxes paid to those with lower lifetime wages. Total
benefits, however, were roughly equivalent to total payroll taxes previously
collected plus interest.! In this way, the U.S. social security system was orig-
inally conceived to be a mostly funded program that deposited payroll taxes
into a Trust Fund invested in special-issue government securities. Payment
of benefits was limited initially to those who contributed to the system.
The funded nature of the program meant that elderly persons who were
already retired at the inception of the social security system - also a group
hit hard by the Great Depression - could not receive benefits because they
had not contributed. Responding to this group's needs, the social security
program then began its long and gradual shift to a pay-as-you-go system. In a
pure pay-as-you-go system, there is no Trust Fund. Rather, benefits are paid
with current tax receipts. This shift toward a pay-as-you-go system began with
the 1939 amendments, which moved the focus away from individual equity
and toward protection of the family, including dependents and survivors.
The 1939 amendments also sought to provide "socially adequate" benefits,
including benefits for the elderly who had paid little or nothing into the
system. The 1950 and 1952 amendments substantially liberalized conditions
under which people could quality for full benefits, and provided full bene-
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fits to newly covered workers not previously covered. Later amendments
increased benefits even more. By 1983, the system was almost entirely pay-as-
you-go: the value of the remaining trust fund was only about $20 billion
which, by one estimate, was less than 1 percent of OASI's liability at the
time.2
The Social Security Act of 1983 (SSA83)addressed the 75-year solvency
problem facing the system at that time by, among other things, increasing
the payroll tax. Projected revenue collected in the following years was antici-
pated to exceed outlays, the extra revenue going into the trust fund. The
intention of SSA83 was, in part, to create a buffer against a recession but,
more importantly, to create a large enough trust fund to weather the large
increase in the retiree/worker ratio as the "baby boom" generation began
to retire around the year 2010. At the end of 1996, the OASI Trust Fund
held $514 billion in government securities. However, the SSA83 did not go
far enough to create a solvent OASI system for the long run. Under the
"intermediate assumptions" of economic and demographic characteristics
of the economy, as calculated by the Board of Trustees Report (1997), the
Trust Fund assets will be exhausted by the end of 2029, after which full
benefits cannot be paid on a timely basis without additional borrowing, an
increase in tax rates, or additional revenue from elsewhere.
The existence of a social security trust fund raises several questions to be
addressed in this chapter. Did the tax increase imposed in the 1983 amend-
ments, which led to a sizable increase in the trust fund, have an economic
rationale? That is, did the 1983 amendments increase national saving? And
irrespective ofwhether the 1983 amendments increased national saving, the
amendments did unambiguously increase social security's reserves. Should
the government seek to increase these reserves even more by investing a
portion of the reserves in equities? In particular, what are the pros and cons
of investing some of the trust fund in corporate equities in order to delay
the collapse of the fund? Another question deals with the optimal size of the
trust fund. Specifically, what are the pros and cons of moving to a funded
social security system by increasing the size of the trust fund? Finally, how
does this option compare with privatizing social security, that is, moving to a
defined-eontribution, funded system based on individual accounts?
What Was the Rationale for the 1983 Amendments?
Mechanically, the trust fund has grown because the United States has chosen
to finance benefits with earmarked taxes that exceed benefit payouts (Feld-
stein and Samwick 1997). Politically, the choice to finance benefits via ear-
marked payroll taxes was no historical accident. Virtually all countries with a
public pension system finance benefits with earmarked payroll taxes (see
Manchester, this volume). President Franklin Roosevelt's intent was to en-
sure that the U.S. social security program was viewed more as a retirement
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plan than as a handout, thereby making it harder to abandon after his
presidency:
We put those payroll contributions there so as to give the contributors a legal, moral,
and political right to collect their pensions.... With those taxes in there, no damn
politician can ever scrap my social security program. (quoted in Miron and Wei!
1997: 11)
But is there a potential economic rationale for increasing the trust fund
through tax increases as was done in the 1983 amendments? The answer is
yes, on two counts. One rationale has to do with tax efficiency interacting
with demographic considerations. Without reserves accumulating in a trust
fund, the social security payroll tax would have to increase significantly in
the future in order to pay for the benefits of the baby-boomer cohort. Eco-
nomic theory shows that the deadweight loss resulting from distortionary
wage taxation rises with the square of the tax rate, so it is more efficient
to smooth payroll taxes over time instead of maintaining a strict pay-as-you-
go system in which future tax rates would have to rise substantially.3 A sec-
ond motivation for funding is distributional: pre-funding future benefits
reduces the tax burden on future generations. These justifications for
the 1983 amendments, however, are valid only to the extent that the 1983
amendments actually increased public, or national, saving.
The 1983 Amendments, Public Saving, and
Political Economy
Did the 1983 amendments increase public saving, or did the existence of
additional resources in the trust fund simply create a ready source of financ-
ing for non-social security government debt? The answer to this question
depends primarily on what one assumes would have happened if the bill had
not been passed (the unobserved counterfactual).
Consider what I refer to as the comprehensive deficit created during time
period t in which implicit pay-as-you-go social security debt is converted into
explicit debt:
(1)
D'+l - D, = [( G, - T,) + r,D,NS }"on-budget" deficit
- (X, - B,)] } social security surplus
+ [(X, - B,) + r,1F,] } "left pocket"
+ [(Dt+ IS - D/) } d in pay-as-you-go net liability
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B, social security benefits paid at time t
D, stock of comprehensive debt at the beginning of time t
,-I
D,NS stockofnon-socialsecuritydebtattimet= L (l+r)(t-1)-('+I)(G,- T,)
s=o
D,s net liability of the pay-as-you-go portion of social security at time t =
present value of benefits less the present value of pay-as-you-go taxes
(before Trust Fund contributions) of workers at time t - 1
G, level ofgovernment spending at time t
r interest rate on government bonds at time t
T, non-social security tax revenue at time t
,-I
1F, trustfundbalanceattimet= L (l+r)(t-1)-'(Bs - Xs)
s=o
X, social security tax revenue at time t
The first [e] term on the right-hand side of equation 1 is what the govern-
ment reports as its official unified national deficit, equal to the primary
deficit plus interest on the outstanding debt, less the social security surplus.
Since social security is now technically off-budget, the total deficit less the
social security surplus is referred to as the "on-budget" deficit. The second
[e] term reflects the borrowing from social security that must be paid back
with interest. This counts as a charge against the government budget exclu-
sive of social security, what I have dubbed the "left pocket" of government.
The third [e] term has two components. The first is equal to the growth at
time t of the net liabilities of the pay-as-you-go portion ofsocial security. The
second component of the third term reflects the payback that social secu-
rity- the "right pocket" of government-receives from the non-social se-
curity side of the federal government. Adding these two components gives
the change in social security's total net liability. The left and right pockets
cancel each other, reflecting the fact that payback of the trust fund with
interest does not affect the comprehensive deficit. Nonetheless, we are still
left with the social security surplus, in the first term ofequation 1.
It is obvious, therefore, that an increase in the payroll tax reduces the
comprehensive deficit-increasing public saving- if the other policy vari-
ables do not change. Moreover, for the purposes of estimating the budget-
ary impacts of specific legislation, the only reasonable approach is to hold
all other laws constant. Nonetheless, some analysts believe that the passage
of a particular piece of legislation could affect the political dynamics of
subsequent legislation. For example, Barry Bosworth (1996: 104) questions
whether it is legitimate to assume that these other policy variables remain
constant when actions are taken to boost trust fund reserves. In his view,
those actions could eventually be offset by changes elsewhere in the budget:
"Most Americans," he argues, "are normally very surprised to learn that the
surplus is being used to finance other programs, and that in most public
discussions the budget deficit is defined to include the finances of social
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security." As shown in equation 1, an increase in payroll taxes would not
increase public saving (including changes to social security's pay-as-you-go
liability) if the payroll tax increase was matched dollar-for-dollar in present
value with increases in promised future benefits, or other government
spending, or reductions in other taxes.
Putting these pieces together, the 1983 amendments would have in-
creased public saving (as defined above) if one assumes that (1) the govern-
ment would have been willing to run a higher total national deficit in the
absence of SSA83, and (2) the government did not promise to increase
future benefits or fail to decrease benefits if this is what would have hap-
pened without SSA83. Excluding trust fund surpluses from the deficit
measure - that is, the "on budget" deficit-could increase public saving by
as much as the trust fund surplus if this policy change forced the govern-
ment to reduce public spending by an equal amount. Then the new "on
budget" deficit is equal to the former unified budget deficit. Bosworth
argues that a focus on the "on budget" deficit would accord better with most
people's perception of the deficit and could therefore increase public
saving.
Some state-level empirical evidence supports Bosworth's position. To
quote Bosworth (1996: 105): "[m]ost states present their budgets in ways
that exclude their retirement programs, and nearly all have sought some
degree of funding of those liabilities." He continues: "While the annual
state retirement fund surpluses have grown steadily, to over 1 percent of
GDP in the 1990s, the nonretirement budget balance has fluctuated about
zero, with no clear tendency to rise or fall over time." But can we safely
assume that state-level evidence is indicative of how the federal government
works? Unfortunately, the answer to this question is unclear.
But whether or not the 1983 amendments increased public saving, the
amendments did increase the accounting measure of the size of the trust
fund. Should the government attempt to increase the trust fund even more
by investing some of the reserves in equities? Without any change in legisla-
tion, this open-market operation would lead to a larger reported unified
deficit. But, as the Technical Panel (p. 86) points out, "It is plausible, how-
ever, that if legislation allowed the Trust Funds to invest in equities, legisla-
tion could also require that the purchase of equities would not count as an
expenditure and thus would not alter the measured unified budget deficit."
The next section renews some of the economic, distributional, and political
ramifications of investing a portion of the trust fund in equities.
Changing the 'nvestment Strategy of the Trust Fund
The equity premium, or the average rate of return to equities above nomi-
nal short term government debt, has been historically about 6 percent
(Kocherlakota 1996). This premium creates a tempting opportunity to help
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rescue the soon-to-be insolvent social security system by investing the large
and growing trust fund in equities instead of government debt. This pro-
posal, discussed for years, has taken on new popularity with the recent
release of Social Security Advisory Council Report (Advisory Council 1997)
in which several council members urged policymakers to consider this op-
tion. According to Jones (1997), switching trust fund investment policy so
that equity composed 21 percent of initial wealth and 50 percent of all
inflows in the stock market would extend the life of the trust fund by eight
years over baseline - from the year 2029 to the year 2037 - if equity invest-
ments performed as expected.
Proponents of investing the trust fund in equities argue that this policy
change could help maintain the current level of benefits in the future with-
out increasing the payroll tax. Moreover, some of the higher returns could
be plowed back into the fund to boost public and national saving. It has also
been argued that a switch toward some equities would also make the govern-
ment a better portfolio manager:
Currently it can be argued that the government is not performing its role as fund
manager for social security as well as it might-not because ofany failure on the part
of those managing the system but because social security by law is allowed to in-
vest only in the most conservative of investments: long-term, low-yield government
bonds. Trustees of private pension systems and managers of state pension systems,
who have the authority to invest much more broadly, would surely be castigated if
they pursued such an ultra-conservative investment policy, and it can be argued that
social security should have the same freedom to invest part of its funds in the broad
equities market representing practically the entire American economy. (Advisory
Council 1997: 83)
Arguments against investing the trust fund in equities are as old as the
social security program itself. Historically, the concern was that the gov-
ernment would accumulate too large a share of the nation's capital stock
(Miron and Weil 1997). More recent concerns have focused on the govern-
ment's using its voting rights as a shareholder in a political manner. Karl
Borden (1995) writes:
Allowing a fund of such magnitude to be invested by government bureaucrats is
asking the government to make risk assessments in the private sector and subjects
the fund to political influence. We have only to consider recent suggestions by the
Clinton administration that private pension funds be required to invest a portion of
their assets in "socially responsible" projects, or to consider the effects of the com-
munity reinvestment requirements the government has placed on the banking sys-
tem, to realize that politicians cannot be trusted to invest fund assets with the objec-
tive ofwealth maximization for fund participants. (1995: 4)
Trust fund investment discussions have also raised questions about how
the risk would be assigned (Zeldes 1997). This issue was considered in broad
terms by the Technical Panel of the recent Advisory Council:
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A different way to think about the proposal is to realize that the risks and returns
in the social security agency's portfolio [of equities] would be passed on to house-
holds, perhaps with some lag. When portfolio returns are high, this improves so-
cial security benefits or reduces social security taxes in the future; when returns
are low, this approach reduces social security benefits or increases taxes in the fu-
ture.... [Another] possibility is that Trust Fund risk will fall on as yet unborn
generations, who have no opportunity to hold stocks now on their own accounts.
Holding equities in the fund could give future generations exposure to current
stock returns, thus improving risk sharing across generations. (Technical Panel 1997:
86)
Size ofTrust Fund Relative to the Market
Would investing the trust fund in equities give the government too large a
share of the private equities market? Hammond and Warshawsky (1996)
argue that the answer is no. They consider the Maintain Benefits (MB) plan
endorsed by six of the 13 members of the Social Security Advisory Council,
which favors investing up to 40 percent of the trust fund in stock. This goal
could be achieved by the year 2014, according to Hammond and War-
shawsky. They then demonstrate that social security's share of the equities
market in the year 2020 would range from 1.9 percent of all U.S. equities
(assuming 9 percent real growth of all assets), to 4.9 percent (under 5
percent growth) to 27.5 percent (under -2 percent growth). They do note,
however, that limited trust fund investments to a narrow index such as the
S&P500 could be problematic. The value ofall U.S. equities totaled about $8
trillion, but the value of the S&P500 was less than 10 percent of this value in
1996, only slightly larger than the value of the trust fund itself. Hammond
and Warshawsky conclude" [p] resumably, social security equity investments
would be made according to some of the broadest indexes (e.g., the broad
Russell or Wilshire indexes) and would, therefore, have a limited sectoral
impact."
Political Stock Choices
Whether the government would-or should-select stocks with political
goals in mind is a thorny issue beyond the scope of this paper. Empirically,
though, it appears that the federal government has exercised restraint from
political bias when retirement assets are held in the form of individual
accounts. Probably the most important example of this is the federal govern-
ment's Thrift Savings Plan, the $30 billion (in 1996) defined-contribution
retirement program for federal employees. The TSP offers an array of pas-
sive index funds free of political constraints.
But, the empirical case for government Trust Fund investments in equi-
ties is not all supportive. State and local governments' employees' pension
funds have experienced far more political intrusions:
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There have been clear instances in which political influences on some of these funds
have led to misguided investments and undue losses for the funds. A number of
states have guidelines for their pension funds that encourage some types of invest-
ments (e.g., investments that focus on projects or companies located in that state)
and discourage other types of investments (e.g., investments in foreign companies or
in companies that are extensively involved abroad or in specific countries), as com-
pared with those that would conform to a "prudent person" fiduciary approach.
Indeed, statistical studies of the annual returns yielded by state employee pension
funds in the late 1980s and early 1990s have shown that the returns are significan tly
lower when the funds' trustees and managers are subject to greater political influ-
ence. And a number of state legislatures have raided their employees' pension funds
when fiscal conditions were perceived to be tight. (White 1996: 17)4
In addition, investing in equities inevitably involves investing in some con-
troversial firms. Obvious examples include tobacco stocks, foreign-owned
firms, environmental polluters, and the like. Less obvious examples- but
probably the most politically charged - include pornography, gambling,
and abortion, as well as corporations whose chief executives are prominent
advocates for partisan causes or religious organizations. These are issues
that must be addressed in any proposal to invest the Trust Fund in equities.
Who Bears the Risk?
If trust fund assets are included in equities, a question arises about who
bears the risk of fluctuating equity values. SSAC members favoring equity
investments were clear that benefits should remain non-random:
... except for this change in investment policy, social security's principles and
structure would remain unchanged under this approach. Social security continues
as a defined-benefit plan, with the amount of benefits and the conditions under
which they are paid still determined by law rather than by individual investments....
there would be ups and downs in returns but only very long-range trends would
matter. And the assumed rate of return, while important, would be secondary to the
fact that benefits would remain defined by law rather than by the relative uncertainty
of individual investment decisions. (Advisory Council 1997: 86)
Hence under the MB plan, the risk associated with trust fund investment
plan is passed on to future generations. Specifically, if the equity fund per-
forms as expected, current workers are rewarded, in terms of future retire-
ment benefits that are larger than those compatible with current tax rates,
but futureworkers are pre-committed to absorb fully any shortfall in the trust
fund below its expected value, in the form of larger taxes. Future workers
are rewarded in the form of a lower payroll tax only if the equity portion of
the Trust Fund performs better than expected. Putting these pieces to-
gether, future workers face an expected payoff equal to zero but with a risky
tax rate. This risk allocation imposes an actuarial pay-as-you-go tax on future
generations, the value ofwhich can be assessed in a complete market setting
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using an option pricing approach. For example, the $3-trillion-dollar equity
investment suggested by some members of the recent Advisory Council
could place as much as a $9 trillion actuarial liability on future generations
(Smetters 1997a).
When there are no missing financial markets, the value of the actuarial
tax placed on future workers is as large as that of keeping the trust fund
invested in bonds and raising the same expected revenue by increasing the
payroll tax only on future workers (Smetters 1997a). Future generations
would actually be better off, relative to this plan, if the payroll tax were
increased immediately so that current workers participated in maintaining
their own future level of benefits - a result that holds at any value of risk
aversion. This result is ironic, given that many of those advocating trust fund
investment in equities see it as a way of avoiding a payroll tax increase.
In reality, of course, financial markets are incomplete in important ways.
One missing element corresponds to the inability of current and future
workers to negotiate risk-sharing contracts such as futures and options con-
tracts. Indeed, an argument for investing the trust fund in equities under
these types of plans is expressed by the Technical Panel (1997: 86): "Hold-
ing equities in the fund could give future generations exposure to current
stock returns, thus improving risk sharing across generations.".'; It follows
that the total actuarial cost to future generations might be less than the
explicit tax increase discussed above.
On the other hand, the total cost might actually be more than the explicit
tax increase, iffuture workers are already exposed to a significant amount of
uncertainty. The pay-as-you-go portions of the defined-benefit Medicare
and social security program alone create an enormous amount of tax rate
uncertainty for future workers. Indeed, the difference in combined OASDI-
HI cost rates between the 1997 Trustees "low cost" and "high cost" esti-
mates over the next 75 years is remarkably large. In particular, the 1997
Trustees estimate that supporting present-law OASDI-HI benefits would re-
quire anything from a negligible increase in the payroll tax to as much as
a 30 percentage point increase! Government debt and the tax treatment
of capital income also shift risk to future generations (Gale 1990; Bohn
1997a). So does the tendency of the budget deficit to increase during eco-
nomic downturns, caused by a decrease in revenue (associated with linear
and progressive taxes) combined with increased mandatory spending dur-
ing a recession. Since the willingness of a person to accept additional corre-
lated risk depends on the person's total portfolio of risky assets and lia-
bilities, it follows that all risks faced by future workers - correlated and
orthogonal to the risks associated with trust fund investment in equities-
must be included in determining whether future workers are currently
under-exposed to contemporaneous shocks. The enormous amount of risk
facing future workers suggests that they might favor an explicit tax, instead
ofan uncertain tax that varied with equity returns. In any case, even if-very
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hypothetically - future workers were under-exposed to current shocks, the
equity investment envisioned by some of the Advisory Council members
cannot actually be beneficial to future workers. The reason is that future
workers bear all the risk but face a zero expected payoff. This zero-mean
gamble, therefore, decreases the expected utility of future workers in pro-
portion to their level of risk aversion.
Another argument for trust fund investment in equities is to expose more
current workers to equity returns (Diamond 1998). Since transaction costs
associated with equity investments are rather low (Mitchell 1998), probably
the best motive for doing this is paternalism (i.e., people "irrationally"
under-exposing themselves to equity risk). But rational agents, who would
like to offset this policy change, would be hurt due to the capital gains tax
and any short-sale constraints. To prevent shifting the risk to future genera-
tions, policymakers would have to commit to reducing benefits on old
people - instead of increasing taxes on young people - if equities under-
performed. It is questionable whether this commitment is time consistent.
Moreover, how would benefits be reduced? Although benefits could be re-
duced in a progressive fashion, an across-the-board reduction could be re-
gressive. The exact politics of what would happen is unclear.
The Impact of Increasing the Size of the Trust Fund
on the Economy
The issue of how to invest social security's current reserves is economically
different from whether to increase the size of the reserves. The former issue
pertains to how to invest existing saving, while the latter pertains to generat-
ing new saving, a process that involves tradeoffs between contemporaneous
and future consumption. In light of the previous political analysis, I will
assume that an increase in the trust fund cannot be counted against the on-
budget deficit in calculating the government's total deficit.
Efficiency Gains
Probably the most important hurdle that any proposal designed to pre-fund
social security must confront is the transition to the new system - in particu-
lar, how to continue to pay benefits to those who are already retired or near
retirement while, at the same time, allowing young savers to divert some of
their social security contributions to private saving accounts. Since social
security is currently mostly pay-as-you-go, allowing young people to shift
their social security contributions to the private capital market removes the
tax revenue needed to pay benefits to the current elderly.
There are several proposals that appear to be able to pre-fund or privatize
social security while making every generation better off. It is important to
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recognize, however, that these proposals are actually piggybacking on some
other efficiency gain associated with tax reform (as in Breyer and Straub
1993) or from a direct arbitrage in which the government effectively bor-
rows at a low rate and lends at a high rate (as in Altig and Gokhale 1997).
Efficiency gains are unlikely to result from increased funding. The reason is
that there is nothing inefficient about a transfer program that does not
distort the price of contemporaneous consumption at the margin unlike,
e.g., capital-income taxation. Other than changing the tax base from wages
to another base, a switch from a pay-as-you-go to a funded system with
recognition of all outstanding liabilities would require the same distortion-
ary tax to service the debt as under the pay-as-you-go system.
This does not mean, however, that the payroll tax does not distort labor
supply. The tradeoff involved in creating a pay-as-you-go program is that the
windfall to the initial elderly comes at the cost ofgenerating a stream of ben-
efits whose present value is less than the present value of taxes for all future
generations. The payroll tax therefore will generally be distorting. The
"curse" of the pay-as-you-go system is that there is no way to reverse this dis-
tortion via pre-funding in such a way that all generations are made better off.
Macroeconomic Gains
For many reformers, efficiency gains are not the end of the story. In particu-
lar, pre-funding social security is viewed as desirable even if sacrifice is re-
quired on the part of transitional generations. And, indeed, the long-run
macroeconomic impact of pre-funding social security can be quite substan-
tial. For instance, Kotlikoff, Smetters, and Walliser (1998) demonstrate that
full pre-funding of social security in their model leads to a 37 percent in-
crease in the long-run capital stock, 4 percent increase in labor supply, 11
percent increase in output, 7 percent increase in wages, and a 19 percent
decline in the cost of capital. This translates into a long-run 5 to 8 percent
increase in full lifetime income, depending on the lifetime income group.
Feldstein and Samwick (1997) also obtained large gains in their model.
As argued above, however, these large long-run gains are not free. In-
creasing the full lifetime resources of future generations requires an equal
present-value reduction in the full lifetime resources of intermediate gener-
ations (Mitchell, Geanakoplos, and Zeldes, this volume). The actual utility
loss on the part of transitional generations would have received from social
security and the bond yield. ti The larger this difference, the less valuable
future social security benefits are to transitional generations and so losing
them is less of a concession. Equivalently, a larger difference means that
more of the payroll tax is effectively devoted to the windfall to the initial
generations who received benefits without paying much into the system,
rather than to one's own retirement benefit.
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Tax Rates
Just how much would the payroll tax change in the long run, if social se-
curity were pre-funded? Feldstein and Samwick (1997) estimate that social
security's current 12.4 percent payroll tax, which will need to rise to 18.75
percent in the future under present-law benefits, can eventually be replaced
with only a 2 percent payroll tax invested in the capital market if the market
performs as expected. This is because the social marginal product of capital
has historically averaged a 9 percent real rate of return while the growth rate
of the pay-as-you-go tax base is predicted to grow at around 1 percent during
the next several decades.
Since the historic rate of return to government debt is only slightly larger
than the future expected return to social security, most of the Feldstein-
Samwick projected reduction in the payroll tax rate comes from exploiting
the wedge between the equity premium and the historical bond yield. (The
Kotlikoff, Smetters, and Walliser 1998 study also relies on this wedge.) To be
sure, exploiting this wedge cannot necessarily be dismissed out-of-hand in
the presence of the debate over why equity has historically delivered a 6
percent higher after-tax rate of return on average over debt (Kocherlakota
1996). In any case, to the extent that this wedge is indeed explained by risk
and is therefore not exploitable, a long-run payroll tax equal to about 14.4
percent will be needed to replace the future 18.75 percent payroll tax using
Feldstein and Samwick's parameter choices. (As noted above, the decline in
the tax rate from 18.75 percent to 14.4 percent comes at a cost to transi-
tional generations.) If social security were switched to a strict defined-
contribution plan, a payroll tax rate less than 14.4 percent would fail to
replace the current level of social security benefits on a risk-adjusted basis. If
social security were kept as a defined-benefit plan, a payroll tax rate less than
14.4 percent would impose a large unfunded liability on future generations.
Smetters (l997b) estimates that the Feldstein-Samwick plan would keep
about seven-eighths of social security's unfunded liabilities in place if social
security is kept as a defined-benefit plan.
Increasing the Size of the Trust Fund Versus Privatization
While pre-funding social security is unlikely to lead to any true efficiency
gains, privatizing social security may. Social security remains a defined-
benefit (DB) pension plan under the pre-funding approach. Privatization
then involves switching from a DB plan to a defined-contribution (DC)
plan. Any advantage or disadvantage that privatization has relative to pre-
funding comes from this switch in pension models. This section considers
several reasons why the DC model is probably superior to the DB model for
providing old-age support.
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Simplicity
While the assumption of full information is standard in economic theory,
the effective marginal tax is actually very difficult to compute under social
security. This is because the tax rate differs not only categorically (i.e., by
earnings level, primary earner vs. secondary earner, etc.) but across the
lifecycle as well, because the private market rate of return is higher than the
rate of return to social security for most contributors (Feldstein and Sam-
wick 1992). Moreover, people might not understand how their benefits are
linked to their previous wage income in a DB plan. Indeed, the reader is
encouraged to question non-economist friends and relatives about how they
think that their social security benefits are calculated: answers like "I don't
know" or "x fraction of my last y :5 three years of earnings before retiring,
multiplied by zyears worked" (i.e., private pension rules!) will undoubtedly
be popular responses. The payroll tax therefore is more distorting than it
need be - and during the prime working years - for these uninformed
workers. 7
The pure efficiency gains associated with full information can be quite
large - e.g., as high as 0.6 percent of julllifetime income (i.e., before the
purchase ofleisure) or 1.5 percent of actuallifetime income (i.e., after the
purchase ofleisure) -ifpeople perceive no marginal linkage in the current
system (Kotlikoff, Smetters, and Walliser 1998). Starting from a higher per-
ceived marginal-tax benefit linkage reduces these gains.
Privatizing social security - and, in particular, moving from a DB to a DC
system - may improve efficiency to the extent that (1) people are not fully
informed of their marginal tax-benefit linkage, and (2) a switch to a DC sys-
tem improves the perceived linkage, thereby reducing the effective tax rate
on labor income. Specifically, relative to social security in which the same
payroll tax is used for redistribution and to pay for one's own future bene-
fits, a DC system can disentangle these two components, and may thereby
improve efficiency. These efficiency gains, though, can theoretically be
achieved within the current pay-as-you-go DB social security system if the gov-
ernment is willing to inform each person at each point in time how an additional
dollar of his payroll tax is translated into future benefits. Doing so, however,
would require exposing the relatively low rate of return received by many
households due to the inter-generational and intra-generational redistrib-
uting roles of social security. Switching to a private DC system therefore
would have the potential advantage of making the overall tax-benefit link-
age explicit without these reporting requirements.
While pre-funding social security under its current DB status would also
reduce the effective tax rate of social security by bringing the rate of return
to social security contributions closer to the market rate of return, this effect
alone will not increase economic efficiency unless accompanied by an in-
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creased understanding of the tax-benefit linkage. Although the efficiency
gains from pre-funding Social Security could be non-trivial if it led to an
improvement in information, they are unlikely to be as significant as those
from moving to a simpler DC system, unless the separate benefit and re-
distribution roles in a funded DB system are made more clear.
Annuity Markets
To the extent that social security provides annuitization that may not other-
wise exist in the private market due to adverse selection, moving to a DC
plan might decrease efficiency unless at least some portion of the assets in
the DC plan required to be annuitized upon retirement.8 However, there is
no reason to believe that the full mandated annuitization inherent in social
security is optimaJ.9 At least some lump-sum disbursement will be desirable
for the purpose of making a bequest, giving inter-vivos transfers to children
(e.g., as a down payment on a house), or holding a buffer for medical and
non-medical expenses faced by beneficiaries and their heirs. While the an-
nuity stream can be used to purchase life insurance in order to make a
bequest, little can be done regarding the other concerns without at least
some lump-sum disbursements. Moreover, on the distributional side, full
mandated annuitization tends to be regressive by redistributing resources
from shorter-lived poor people to longer-lived rich people, ceteris paribus. A
DC plan, in contrast, can deal with annuitization via mandates. It is also
inherently more flexible in the design of the payout options. For example,
Chile allows for lump-sum withdrawals above some minimum mandated
annuity level.
Risk Sharing
It is also commonly argued that a funded DB plan can better shift aggregate
risk across generations. This risk shifting, however, requires that at least part
of the payroll tax in a DB plan is transferred from young to old workers.
This, in turn, complicates the marginal tax-benefit linkage in the DB plan.
In contrast, a DC plan can do better.
At least some of the risks in the DC plan would also tend to be shifted
across generations, since the government cannot credibly commit to allow-
ing people to retire with few assets. Indeed, while DC plans are commonly
criticized for forcing workers to bear all the risk, all actual major privatiza-
tion implementations continue to provide rather generous minimum guar-
antees financed on a pay-as-you-go basis. lO A realistic DC plan, therefore,
would be composed of a no-redistribution private account, along with a
pure redistribution add-on tax. This separation has the advantage of a com-
partmentalizing the pure distorting tax, thereby avoiding commingling re-
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distribution with one's own retirement saving. This "twin pillars" approach
has been extremely popular in Latin America (Mitchell and Barreto 1997).
In addition, the DC plan would tend to be more flexible than the DB plan
in designing risk sharing. This is because the minimum benefit guarantee
could be set at a lower and more reasonable level than the fixed benefit
guarantee that might be inherent in a DB plan. While it is true that the fixed
benefit guarantee passes any excess returns forward in time, the option
value of this feature is quite small for realistic parameterizations (Smetters
1997b). The guarantee level itself is the primary issue, and a smaller mini-
mum benefit will tend to have a much lower unfunded actuarial cost than a
larger fixed benefit. Indeed, it is unlikely that the level of risk shifting that
might be inherent in a funded DB plan is optimal ex ante, unless policy-
makers actively change benefits in addition to changing taxes in response to
large shocks to equity prices. To be sure, some risk shifting across genera-
tions is desirable in order to avoid a low level of post-retirement consump-
tion. Guaranteeing a higher level of post-retirement consumption, however,
would be essentially redistributional in nature and would work in the op-
posite direction from reducing unfunded liabilities.
Administrative Costs
DC plans are commonly criticized as having higher administrative costs than
a well-managed DB plan. Promoters of this position often point to the high
transaction costs that exist in both the Chilean and UK systems. In contrast,
the U.S. social security system is often argued as being remarkably efficient.
However, there are examples of very efficient full-featured DC plans in
the United States. Indeed, while promoters of the high-transaction-eosts
argument typically consider administrative charges of around 100 basis
points, a large passive index fund can, in reality, have much lower overhead
fees (Mitchell 1998) . Total administrative fees (excluding collection fees) of
the Thrift Savings Plan, which is the DC plan for federal workers with $45
billion in assets at the end of 1996, are currently less than nine basis points
(11 basis points if forfeited non-vested employer contributions are ex-
cluded). This overhead charge includes many basic services such as money
management, operating and development costs of the recordkeeper's com-
puter system, and printing and mailing of publications and participants'
statements, as well as the TSP Service Office that handles its optional an-
nuities and loan programs in addition to standard inter-fund transfers and
account balance inquiries. But even nine basis points is pessimistic: the TSP
fees have decreased almost monotonically from over 30 basis points in 1988,
the year ofthe Fund's inception. In the future overhead fees could decrease
to less than a single basis point, or about \lioo the fee assumed by promoters
of the high-transaction-eosts argument. The TSP avoids high administrative
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fees, in part, because it limits investment choice to three (soon to be four)
passively-managed fund options.
While limiting choice is not necessarily efficient even if it reduces costs,
restricted and regulated choice might be a desirable route to take in a
privatized social security system where excessive brokerage fees resulting
from uninformative advertising, wasteful competition over a homogeneous
product, "account churning," and fraud are especially important issues.
Limiting choice might also be desirable on moral hazard grounds in order
to prevent excessive risk-taking by those whose account balances are low
enough to trigger a minimum benefit. With these controls in place, it is
quite possible that a DC plan could havejust as low transaction costs as social
security-and perhaps even lower, if choices are restricted enough so that
firms are basically forced to compete on the cost side instead of on the
revenue side. Achieving low costs might also require allowing each person to
have only a single account in order to reduce record keeping.
Political Uncertainty and Redistribution
Some might view any inefficiency caused by redistribution within social
security as simply the cost of maintaining public suppon for redistribution.
Alternative forms of redistribution compatible with a DC model would
probably gain public support, however. This is especially true of the Earned
Income Tax Credit (EITC) program, which rewards people for working.
Indeed, the EITC program has been expanded in recent years, even in wake
of the decline in many other forms of welfare. Replacing social security's
intra-generational redistribution with an EITC program can lead to non-
trivial efficiency gains in the presence of borrowing constraints, especially
for the poor (Smetters 1997c).
It has sometimes been argued that a DC plan might face lower political
risk than a DB plan, since benefits are no longer determined by the will of
policymakers. But the tax treatment of DC accounts will subject them to
political uncertainty as well, so it is unclear which plan performs better here
(a point emphasized in Smetters 1997b and Diamond 1998). It is tme,
though, that the assets in a DC plan are decentralized, a potential advantage
over pre-funding. Indeed, if the government failed to take social security
completely off budget, or reverted back to the current unified budget deficit
measure in the future, all of the assets in the trust fund could be spent on
either tax reductions or government consumption without changing either
the reponed trust fund balance or "deficit" measure.
Conclusion
A trust fund is an accounting device that reflects a political choice to finance
social security benefits with earmarked taxes rather than with general reve-
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nue. Increasing the size of the trust fund through a payroll tax increase, like
the one implemented in the 1983 amendments, leads to a smaller distortion
of labor supply, relative to the policy of waiting to increase the payroll tax
only when necessary to pay for benefits. An increase in the payroll tax before
the baby-boomer cohort begins to retire might also be justified on distribu-
tional grounds. These arguments, however, are at least partially undermined
if an increase in the size of the trust fund is offset by either dissaving in the
non-social security side of government, or an increase in future benefits.
Calculating a value for this offset is an important topic for future research.
We also summarize previous analyses of the merits of investing the trust
fund in equities. Under such a proposal, it is unlikely that the government
would own a large share of total assets in the economy. Limiting trust fund
investments to a narrow index such as the S&P500, however, could be prob-
lematic, due to the small size of the funds in such an index relative to the
total assets in the economy. Mixed evidence is reported on the hypothesis
that politicians might manipulate stock choices for political gain. Although
the federal government has resisted this temptation with retirement assets
held in the form ofindividual accounts, the trust funds ofstate and local gov-
ernments have experienced some political intrusions. Finally, we showed
that investing the trust fund in equities under the current defined-benefit
system imposes a non-trivial actuarial tax on future workers. Whether this
redistribution is good or bad is a normative question outside the scope of
this chapter. In theory, future generations may not be harmed very much by
this transfer of risk, because no market exists allowing current and future
generations to engage in risk sharing. On the other hand, a substantial
amount of risk is already being transferred to future generations under
baseline policy, and transferring even more risk might potentially be very
harmful. Quantifying the amount ofrisk under baseline policy is difficult but
a worthwhile avenue for future research.
Finally, we described the merits of pre-funding social security (increas-
ing the size of the Trust Fund) and privatization (switching to a defined-
contribution system). It was argued that while pre-funding social security
would tend to result in few - if any - true efficiency gains, privatization
might. A privatized system is more simple and more flexible. Both of these
factors can result in potentially large efficiency gains. Quantitative gains
from simplicity (coming from reduced labor supply distortion) are avail-
able, though potential gains associated with greater flexibility have not yet
been quantified. Calculating these gains represents an important avenue
for future research.
The author has received very helpful comments from Bob Dennis, Doug
Hamilton, Olivia Mitchell, and Jan Walliser. The views expressed herein do
not necessarily reflect those of the author and not the Congressional Budget
Office.
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Notes
1. A summary ofmajor changes in the social security program is given in Kollmann
(1996) and the Social Security Bulletin (1995).
2. The value of the OASI Trust Fund at the end of 1993 was $19.7 billion (1995
Statistical Supplement, Table 4.Al). Feldstein (1995) estimates that social security's
net liability (present value offuture benefits less present value offuture payroll taxes
across all living adults) in 1983 equaled $5 trillion using a 3 percent discount rate.
For other estimates see Goss (this volume).
3. A general intertemporal tax smoothing argument was first developed by Barro
(1979) and has been examined in a stochastic environment by Bohn (1990).
4. The empirical evidence referred to by White can be found in Romano (1993),
Mitchell (1993), and Marr, Nofsinger and Trimble (1996).
5. Bohn (1997b) provides a rigorous treatment, as well as thoughtful cautions, on
this result.
6. In fact, the low historical risk of the wages and salary base - the source of the
rate of return in a pay-as-you-go social security system - relative to historical bonds
suggests that an even lower rate could be used to discount social security liabilities
(Smetters 1997b).
7. Technically, the payroll tax need not be fully distorting even in this case, if
earnings near retirement are highly correlated with previous productivity levels.
8. Estimates of the severity of this problem are found in Friedman and Warshawsky
(1990) and Mitchell, Poterba, and Warshawsky (1999). Abel (1986), however, shows
theoretically, that the annuity protection that social security already provides tends
to enhance the adverse selection problem in the private annuity. In recent analysis
using a large-scale simulation model, Walliser (1997), shows that even if economic
agents purchased a large amount of annuities due to an absence ofa bequest motive,
the excess of the price of an annuity above its actuarially fair value would, as a
percent of the fair value, only fall from about 9 percent to 6 percent. It follows that
privatization without mandates may not lead to the development of an annuity
market with actuarially-fair annuities.
9. Diamond (1998) argues that the value of the "rolling annuity" (risk pooling in
case of death prior to retirement) provided by social security can be quite sizable.
A portion of a DC plan's assets could also be required to be forfeited upon pre-
retirement death. This option would be more flexible than full annuitization.
10. These guarantees have been made explicit in every large privatization experi-
ment, including Chile and El Salvador, the countries with the most ambitious pri-
vatization implementations to date. These countries promise to "top up" under-
performing private accounts in order to guarantee a minimum level of benefits that,
as a fraction of income, is equal to about the average U.S. benefit. The World Bank's
privatization plan recommends a similarly sized guarantee. Australia guarantees that
its pensioners will do just as well under its new system as under the old. See also
Pennacchi (this volume).
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